.
Robert J. Carton, Ph.D.
J. William Hirzy, Ph.D.
National Treasury Employees Union, Chapter 280 Washington, D.C.
June 1998
Note: The following is not the full statement. We have left out the authors' discussion of the NAEP Code of Ethics. To read their entire statement, visit: http://www.rvi.net/~fluoride/naep.htm
ABSTRACT
As stated in the NAEP Code of Ethics and Standards of Practice for Environmental
Professionals, the "keystone of professional conduct is integrity..."
This means that professionals must be responsible for the validity of
their work, which must be conducted without "dishonesty, fraud, deceit
or misrepresentation or discrimination." They must not put professional
judgment aside in order to twist facts and/or conclusions to give a client,
or a superior, a desired outcome. Further, professional integrity does
not stop when a report is signed. There is a continuing responsibility
for seeing that a report is not misrepresented by others, or altered to
change its data or conclusions.
In 1997, the National Federation of Federal Employees, Local 2050 (the
"Union"), representing all 1400 non-management professionals
at the headquarters of the U.S. environmental Protection Agency (EPA),
incorporated a modified version of the NAEP Code of Ethics into its Collective
Bargaining Agreement with EPA. This paper discusses the Agreement and
the need for further refinements of it, along with the event that galvanized
this effort, viz. the November 14, 1985 Federal Register notice setting
a health-based standard for fluoride in drinking water.
The NAEP (National Association of Environmental Professionals) Code required
some minor modifications to better clarify the role of professionals who
provide analyses of issues in a regulatory context. Regulations require
specific scientific endpoints to be defined. Politicians often demand
analyses that support politically acceptable solutions. This presents
a serious dilemma in that professional ethics are forced to take a back
seat to political expediency. An enforceable code of ethics is needed
to permit honest analysis to surface from professional staff without fear
of intimidation or reprisal.
The need for a Code of Ethics at EPA has been emphasized time after time
since the Agency began in 1970. This need became critical when it published
the Fluoride in Drinking Water Standard in 1985. An investigation by the
Union revealed that scientific support documents for the health-based
standard were crafted to support a long-standing public health policy.
Objective scientific methods of data collection and analysis were avoided
in favor of presenting information that agreed with current policy.
The National Association of Environmental Professionals (NAEP) Code of Ethics
The NAEP Code of Ethics and Standards of Practice
for Environmental Professionals ("NAEP Code")1 states self-evident
truths in a way reminiscent of the Declaration of Independence. In the
first line it says that "the keystone of professional conduct is
integrity." It then expands on the meaning of integrity by noting
that professionals must:
1. be responsible for the validity of their own work.
2. ensure that it is done objectively, using the best scientific and engineering
principles available.
3. not condone misrepresentation of their work.
4. fully disclose any possible conflict of interest.
5. not be involved in "dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation
or discrimination."
6. not accept work if it is contingent upon violating their code of ethics.
The principles outlined in the NAEP Code, if followed, should ensure a
healthy profession and result in the respect of those coming into contact
with its members. It should be easy for anyone considering joining NAEP
to agree with them.
There is a second set of statements in the Code which are offered as "guidance"
for professionals. Two of these, we believe belong in the list of ethical
principles. The first is the statement that one should work on projects
for which one is qualified, and the other is that work should be done
in concert with laws, regulations, and ordinances. It will become clear
as we discuss the application of the code to the activities of EPA why
we believe these are necessary.
Environmental Professionals at EPA Headquarters
In 1982, all of the non-management scientists,
lawyers and engineers working at EPA Headquarters, in their own declaration
of independence, decided to organize into a union that could bargain with
the Agency over conditions of employment. The organizing committee believed
there were so many outstanding grievances with management that the only
way to get resolution was by forming a Labor union. According to the Civil
Service Reform Act, the Agency must recognize and bargain with a legally
constituted union, whereas it can ignore other employee groups, no matter
how thoroughly constituted or well-intentioned they may be.
Our grievances with the "King" (at that time it was the "Queen",
EPA Administrator Anne Gorsuch) centered around the misuse of professional
services, creating an unethical climate that served politics, but not
truth. Management was enamored with the idea that "management rights"
included, among other things, mandating the "arranging" or "rearranging"
of scientific facts so they support predetermined conclusions. Management
acted as if the only moral duty of employees was the duty to obey 2 -
even in spite of the results at Nuremberg.
When the required representational election was held in 1984, the Union,
the National Federation of Federal Employees, Local 2050 (NFFE), was chosen
overwhelmingly by a 90% plurality vote. After lengthy negotiations, we
signed our first contract with EPA in 1986. We then began to fight for
the ethical and competent practice of science and law at EPA. Our most
visible effort - and the one that will be the focus of the remainder of
this presentation - was our activity regarding EPA's regulation for fluoride
in drinking water, during which we attempted to file an amicus brief in
the law suit brought by the Natural Resources Defense Council against
EPA in April of 1986 on this issue. We also did a great deal of work on
the toxic nature of emissions from latex-backed carpeting that poisoned
over 300 EPA employees at EPA Headquarters, and the dangerously explosive
nature of aerosol foggers used extensively by ordinary citizens in their
homes. In all of these issues, professionals were hindered in or prevented
from carrying out their sworn duty to protect the public. We took these
issues to the public and the Congress in hope of forcing a change in the
ethical climate at EPA.
While these efforts were underway, we came upon a pamphlet from NAEP.
It contained a Code of Ethics which immediately struck us as a possible
solution to our problems. If we could negotiate an enforceable code of
ethics with the Agency, we might have some leverage in eliminating the
ethical abuses that were occurring. So, we took the NAEP Code, modified
it slightly, and presented it to the Agency in 1988 as a bargaining proposal
for negotiations.
...
Applying the Code to the Fluoride in Drinking Water Standard.
As stated in the proposed code of ethics, it
is the duty of every professional to understand the laws under which they
operate. Laws require professionals who are developing the scientific
bases for regulations to ask certain questions. In this particular case,
the Safe Drinking Water Act of 1975 5 (modified in 1986, "the Act")
said that EPA should identify contaminants in drinking water and set a
"recommended maximum contaminant level (RMCL)" for each. The
Act explains that:
RMCLs [changed to MCL goals in 1986] "...are non-enforceable health
goals which are to be set at levels which would result in no known or
anticipated adverse effects and which allow an adequate margin of safety."
[emphasis added]
When the Act says "no known...adverse effects" can occur at
the level chosen, that means everyone must be protected: young and old,
and those with health problems such as diabetics or those with kidney
impairment. EPA is not supposed to protect just the average person, but
everyone. The Act recognized the inherent right of every individual to
be able to drink safe water. Setting a standard also means EPA has to
consider all other sources of the contaminant, in food, beverages, toothpaste,
etc., otherwise, the contribution EPA allowed for water may put some individuals
at risk. This is not always an easy task, but it is clear what the considerations
must be.
The Act also requires EPA to consider "anticipated adverse effects."
For instance, if data show that consumption of a certain amount of a contaminant
over 20 years causes disease, then EPA is required to consider the level
it would have to set that would be safe over a lifetime.
And who should make this call? As noted in the code of ethics, it should
be someone qualified to make that judgment. Should a health call be made
by politicians or professionals, such as doctors, biochemists, statisticians,
chemists, etc. each addressing their particular area of expertise?
EPA is also required to set an enforceable standard for each contaminant
called the "Maximum Contaminant Level (MCL)". The Act explains
that:
MCLs "...are enforceable standards and are to be set as close to
the RMCLs as is feasible...'feasible' means with the use of the best technology,
treatment techniques and other means, which the administrator finds are
generally available (taking cost into consideration)."
The bottom line is that an MCL is a level which may not be safe, or at
least not as safe, as the RMCL because in many cases it is just not practical
or economical to set a level equal to the RMCL. The best example of how
these distinctions are made can be seen in the lead standard. The health
goal is zero, but the MCL is 15 ug/l(ppb). The MCL is very much a political
decision, although it still must be kept as close to the RMCL as possible.
The RMCL for Fluoride in Drinking Water
EPA set an RMCL of 4 mg/l(ppm) for fluoride in
drinking water on November 14, 1985. 6 We are now going to examine how
that decision was reached in light of the original NFFE code of ethics
proposed to EPA. We are selecting only the RMCL because it represents
a health judgment unencumbered by political considerations. In the discussion
that follows, keep in mind that 1 mg/l of fluoride is the level usually
recommended for water fluoridation. This level has been recommended for
over 50 years by the Public Health Service without wavering. In 1950,
the PHS pronounced fluoridation "safe and effective" 7 and it
has made such grand claims ever since. In 1990, Dr. Harald Loe, D.D.S.,
Director of the National Institute of Dental Research said: "Water
fluoridation is one of the most effective and economical public health
measures ever undertaken." 8
The Surgeon General's Report
In developing the scientific support for its
regulatory action, the Agency first turned for guidance to the Public
Health Service and asked its chief, Dr. C. Everett Koop, the Surgeon General
of the U.S., for his opinion. He in turn formed two ad hoc committees:
one to deal with dental effects of fluoride exposure and the other with
"non-dental" effects. The story of the latter committee ("the
Ad Hoc Committee on the Non-Dental Health Effects of Fluoride in Drinking
Water", the "Committee") is the more interesting.
We want to point out, right at the start, that deferring to the Public
Health Service was ethically questionable. This is because of the PHS's
long history of claiming credit for the discovery of fluoridation and
for promoting its use throughout the country. The PHS had the most to
lose from revelation of any information that might show that the practice
they had been promoting for decades was actually harmful.
The PHS proved its bias straight away by selecting Committee members who
could be counted on to protect their policy. Many were on record as vigorous
promoters of the idea of adding fluoride to water "as totally safe
and effective." Some were from the National Institute for Dental
Research. On the other hand, not one critic of fluoridation from the scientific
community was allowed a place at the table. (EPA sent observers to the
meetings.) The final report of the Committee 9 also alluded to a group
of advisors, who "were asked to review documents and to provide counsel
in regard to the Committee's recommendations." Their recommendations
may have superseded those of the Committee, although their precise role
is, even now, not known.
Despite the biases of the Committee, they provided some genuine surprises.
In secret, closed door testimony 10 (obtained under the Freedom of Information
Act by the Safe Water Foundation of Texas), the Committee members expressed
great uncertainty about the available scientific data and what they should
recommend as a safe level of fluoride in drinking water:
"Q. Dr. Frank A. Smith: 'Why don't we see it [skeletal
fluorosis] in the areas of 4 ppm?' [RMCL = 4 mg/l(ppm)]
A. Dr. Jay R. Shapiro (Committee chairperson): 'I think
you have to conclude that we haven't looked for it and we really don't
know'."
"Q. Dr. Shapiro: 'You have some data on a town in
Texas where there were some children with rather severe fluorosis with
a level of something like 1.2 ppm in the drinking water. Is that true?'
A. Dr. Smith: I think that is correct'."
"Dr. Wallach [referring to dental fluorosis]: You would have to have
rocks in your head, in my opinion to allow your child much more than 2
ppm'."
These statements were highlighted in an article by investigative reporter,
Joel Griffiths, in the Medical Tribune 11 in 1989. He quoted expert after
expert saying they just didn't have enough information to make a conclusion,
and they often disagreed among themselves.
The Committee eventually concluded, on a vote of 7 to 2, that fluoride
should not exceed twice the optimal level of fluoride for children under
9 years of age, viz. 1.4 - 2.4 mg/l. The draft report of the Committee
12 stated that "severe dental fluorosis per se constitutes an adverse
health effect that should be prevented." They also expressed concern
with the lack of data relative to:
"1. The effect of supraoptimal fluoride intake on bone turnover in
children and the relationship of moderate to severe dental fluorosis on
skeletal development.
"2. The need to confirm or refute Japanese studies implicating chronic
fluorosis and myocardial disease. (Takamori, Tokushima, J. Experimental
Med. 2:225, 1955)." [in another section of the report they identify
these concern levels as 1.9-4.9 mg/l.]
To their discredit, however, they said that calcified ligaments [resulting
in arthritic pains and a reduction in the flexibility of joints] was not
an adverse health effect, unless it was accompanied by crippling skeletal
fluorosis with x-rays showing bone lesions. They also recommended a research
program:
"The committee strongly recommends that the PHS and the EPA join
to enlarge the body of information relative to skeletal maturation and
growth in children ingesting more than twice the recommended daily intake
of fluoride." [i.e. 1.4 to 2.4 mg/l]
Once the original conclusions of the Committee became known through the
FOIA process, it was obvious that the final report did not track with
those original conclusions. The cover page carefully states that the report
was "based upon" the Committees recommendations.(emphasis added)
According to investigative reporter Dan Grossman, who talked to a number
of the Committee members, the changes were made without the knowledge
or consent of the Committee.13 This is a direct misrepresentation of the
efforts of the Committee and an obvious violation of the NFFE Code of
Ethics.
The altered conclusions of the final report
While the final report stated that the Committee
recommended more research on bone in children, it neglected to mention
the Committee had identified a level of concern of 1.4 to 2.4 mg. It also
failed to mention the conclusion of the Committee about possible heart
effects. The final report also added a conclusion that was not in the
draft report. It said: "There exists no directly applicable scientific
documentation of adverse medical effects at levels of fluoride below 8
mg/l." It also added the following:
"...it can be concluded that 4 times optimum in U.S. drinking water
supplies is a level that would provide 'no known or anticipated adverse
effect with a margin of safety'."
Dental fluorosis was one of the areas in which some of the most dramatic
and far reaching changes were made from the draft to the final report.
The firm conclusion that it was an adverse health effect was changed.
The final report said:
"It is inadvisable for the fluoride content of drinking water to
be greater than twice the current optimal level (1.4-2.4 mg/l) for children
up to age 9 in order to avoid the uncosmetic effects of dental fluorosis."
(emphasis added).
This is a health effect that occurs in varying degrees as the teeth of
children are forming up until about the age of about 9. The mild form
of the disease may only show white spots, while the moderate and severe
forms (called objectionable dental fluorosis") are much more disruptive.
Severe dental fluorosis is classified by the PHS as follows:
"All enamel surfaces are affected and hypoplasia is so marked that
the general form of the tooth may be affected. The major diagnostic sign
of this classification is the discrete or confluent pitting, brown stains
are widespread and teeth often present a corroded-like appearance14."
Even after one discounts the unethical omission in the final report of
concerns about cardiac and skeletal effects, if the conclusion of the
Committee in the draft report that dental fluorosis was an adverse health
effect were allowed to stand, then fluoridation as we know it would have
been doomed. EPA noted in the proposed rule in May 1985, that severe dental
fluorosis was found to occur at 0.8 mg/l. This is at the level that fluoridation
policy generally recommends (i.e. 0.7 - 1.2 mg/l depending on the local
ambient average temperature). Since the Act requires a margin of safety,
in order to insure that no child would be subjected to this disfiguring
disease, the RMCL would have to be set much lower. This would have effectively
eliminated the practice of fluoridation, since most water supplies already
have naturally occurring fluoride at about 0.2 mg/l.
This obvious threat was recognized by one of the Committee members, Mr.
John Small, an information specialist and one of the chief fluoridation
promoters for the National Institute of Dental Research. In a memo to
Dr. Jay Shapiro, chairman of the Committee, Mr. Small said:
"I think we as a committee need to recognize that this is a departure
from the conclusions reached through fifty years of PHS-sponsored eidemiological
and clinical investigations. I too feel that moderate and severe dental
fluorosis are to be avoided, but am less certain that we should invert
history to accomplish that end."15
So the Committee's conclusions were changed to call dental fluorosis a
"cosmetic effect" and not an adverse health effect, eliminating
it as an end point of concern for possible regulation under the Safe Drinking
Water Act. We only learned about these facts much later, when the Union
began an investigation of the regulation proposed in May of 1985.
The Cover-up at the U.S.E.P.A.
The transcripts of the Committee's deliberations
mentioned above show that management officials from EPA were present as
observers. There is some evidence that they tried to influence the Committee
towards a lower standard. However, when the final document was delivered
to EPA16, knowing full well that it did not accurately represent the deliberations
of the Committee, there is no evidence that these EPA officials ever protested.
Sometime in the middle of April, 1985, just one month before the proposed
RMCL was published in the Federal Register17, private discussions with
key personnel involved in the drafting of the new regulation began to
surface some serious ethical problems. It started with a chance meeting
between one of the authors (Carton) and a professional from the Office
of Drinking Water in a hallway of the East Tower of Waterside Mall, EPA's
headquarters. When we saw him in the hallway, he looked disgusted, so
we asked him what was going on. He said he was writing the fluoride regulation
and didn't believe a thing he was writing. He had to carry on, however,
because it was his job. To put it another way, it was his duty to obey.
There was also the unstated understanding which all employees know, that
if you buck the decision you may end up with a poor performance appraisal
or worse. Years later one professional, who blew the whistle on the downgrading
of results in the animal cancer study of fluoride in drinking water, was
fired, although later rehired after a protracted court battle.18
When the fluoride regulation was published, its author did protest with
an unsigned, tongue-in-cheek "press release" that was circulated
among the staff.
"The Office of Drinking Water in conjunction with OMB proudly presents
their new and improved Fluoride Regulation or 'How we stopped worrying
and learned to love funky teeth.' Up to now EPA, under the Safe Drinking
Water Act, has regulated fluoride in order to prevent children from having
teeth which looked like they had been chewing brown shoe polish and rocks.
The old standard which was based upon the consumer's average shoe size
and the phase of the moon generally kept fluoride levels below 2.3 mg/l.
EPA in response to new studies which only confirmed the old studies, and
some flat out political pressure, has decided to raise the standard to
4 mg/l. This increase will allow 40% of all children to have teeth gross
enough to gag a maggot. EPA selected this level based upon a cost effectiveness
study which showed that it is cheaper for people to keep their mouths
shut then to remove the fluoride."19
As Vice-President of the Union at that time, the lead author of this paper
brought the matter of possible fraud to the attention of the Executive
Board and it decided to look into the matter. Never having heard anything
negative about fluoride in water, they were anxious to find out what was
so disturbing about the regulation EPA was about to publish in the Federal
Register. The Board's education began when public hearings were held on
the proposed standard and some very knowledgeable citizens presented persuasive
scientific arguments against the proposal. Among other things, these citizens
presented us with the transcripts of the closed door meeting of the Surgeon
General's ad hoc committee. The union became convinced that science did
not support what EPA was doing and politics were dictating everything.
Since then, three other professionals who were working in the Office of
Drinking Water at the time the proposal was drafted have come forward.
They told us that it was well known that the data did not fit the conclusions
being presented to the public. As a matter of fact, the original support
document for the regulation, written by the professional staff, had concluded
that the data supported a RMCL of 2 mg/l.
The staff believed that objectionable dental fluorosis should be considered
an adverse health effect. They conveyed this finding to Mr. Vic Kim, Director
of the Office of Drinking Water, who informed the Administrator, Mr. William
Ruckelshaus 20 that:
"It is difficult to conclude a priori that teeth which spontaneously
pit are stronger teeth. Further, data suggest that the effects of fluorosis
are not merely discoloration and pitting, but fracturing, caries and tooth
loss as well...it is difficult... to conclude that such effects are not
adverse."
According to members of the professional staff in the Office of Drinking
Water, Mr. Kim's superior, Mr. Jack Ravan, Director of the Office of Water,
directed that the scientific support documents be rewritten to support
an RMCL of 4 mg/l. The final regulation, signed by the new EPA Administrator,
Mr. Lee Thomas, said: "There is no adequate evidence of chipping,
cracking or loss of enamel associated with [dental] fluorosis."
It was entirely unnecessary for practical or economic reasons to raise
the RMCL to 4 mg/l, because it was an unenforceable goal. Practical and/or
economic reasons could have been used to raise the MCL to 4 mg/l without
playing politics with the health data. As mentioned previously, this logic
was used to set the lead standard. The health goal was set at zero, while
the enforceable standard was established at 15 ug/l(ppb).
Skeletal Fluorosis
The Committee identified only a few adverse health
effects: death, gastrointestinal hemorrhage, gastrointestinal irritation,
arthralgias, and crippling skeletal fluorosis (CSF). The last health effect
was said to occur at exposure levels lower than the others, so the RMCL
and MCL of 4 mg/l are based on CSF. Like dental fluorosis, skeletal fluorosis
is the result of fluoride interfering with the normal production and remineralization
of collagen. When discussing this disease, experts inevitably refer back
to the classic 1937 study by Dr. Kaj Roholm on Danish cryolite workers.
21 Summarizing Roholm's work, the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) described
three progressive stages of the disease. 22 In Phase 1, X-rays begin to
show changes in the bones of the pelvis and vertebrae. By the time Phase
3 (CSF) is reached, all bones are affected, particularly cancellous bones,
and the bones in the extremities are thickened. There is also considerable
calcification of the ligaments of neck and vertebral column. In some cases,
the vertebrae in the spine are actually fused.
Phase 1 is not just a subclinical stage of the disease seen on X-rays.
Roholm found that 10 of 26 workers with Phase 1 had rheumatic pains compared
to 1 of 11 workers with no sign of osteosclerosis in their x-rays. Half
of all workers with Phase 1 and 2 had a reduced ability to rotate their
upper torso. Workers exposed for as little as 2.4 years had Phase 1 of
the disease, exposure for 4.8 years for Phase 2, and 11.2 years for Phase
3. EPA inexplicably set the standard based only on the third Phase, CSF.
From a professional health point of view, it is impossible to claim that
arthritic pains and reduced body flexibility are not adverse health effects.
One can only conclude that not considering Phases 1 and 2 skeletal fluorosis
was done to avoid a conflict with current health policy, i.e. its unequivocal
pronouncement of safety for water fluoridation.
The Daily Dose and Time Required to Cause CSF
In his letter transmitting the final report of
the Committee to EPA, Surgeon General Koop said that arthritis and CSF
both begin to occur simultaneously, when fluoride consumption exceeds
20 mg/day. He also added the caveat that it takes more than 20 years to
cause these effects. His assertion differed from the conclusion of the
National Academy of Science, which also was a source of advice to EPA
on this matter. The NAS, according to EPA in the proposed regulation,
reported that it takes only 10 years to cause CSF at a dose of 20 mg/day.
EPA, however, decided in the proposed regulation to use Dr. Koop's numbers:
". . .EPA agrees with the Surgeon General that crippling skeletal
fluorosis is an adverse health effect which results from intakes of fluoride
of 20 mg/day over periods of 20 years or more."
Two concerned citizens have identified some serious problems with both
the NAS and EPA claims of the dose/time necessary to cause CSF. Ms. Martha
Bevis of the Safe Water Foundation of Texas could not find where the 20
mg/day was actually derived. Going back to the original work by Roholm
she found that he mentioned a figure of 0.2 mg per kg of body weight,
which for the standard 70 kg man would translate into 14 mg. Ms. Darlene
Sherrell went further and found that, in 1979, Dr. Hodge had changed his
much quoted dose/time figures to a minimum of 10 mg/day for 10-20 years.
23 (emphasis added) EPA referenced the 1979 paper, but used the Surgeon
General's figures which were higher for reasons that can only be considered
suspect. (Note: While EPA has not yet corrected its figures to correspond
to Hodge's reduced figures, the NAS did so in 199324.)
There is another serious deficiency with the dose/time figures used by
EPA. The Act requires the regulations to protect everyone, not just 20-year-olds.
The Committee stated in its final report that "Fluoride in bone increase
with age and linearly in relation to fluoride intake." Therefore,
it would seem logical to conclude that if 20 mg caused CSF in 20 years,
then 10 mg would cause CSF in 40 years. Simple arithmetic tells you that
only 5.7 mg a day for a lifetime of 70 years could cause CSF. This calculation
was never done. If it were done (starting with the correct figures of
10 mg/day for 10 years) fluoridation would be stopped today.
Fluoride Dose from Current Standard of 4 mg/l.
In proposing the RMCL of 4 mg/l, EPA noted that
1% of the population drink more than 5.5 liters/day. This means these
individuals could be ingesting 22 mg/day or more from drinking water alone.
Since EPA stated unequivocally that 20 mg/day for 20 or more years caused
CSF (forgetting for a moment that these figures are incorrect), EPA admitted
to violating the Act which requires the standard to be set so that no
one is at risk of an adverse health effect, in this case CSF. Although
the raw data about water consumption were contained in the proposed regulation,
the simple calculation presented here was nowhere to be found.
In reality, most water supplies that are not contaminated with industrial
pollution, have low levels of naturally occurring fluoride. Surface waters
generally average about 0.2 mg/l. Where fluoride is added to water (which
is 65% of the country), the level is raised to approximately 1.0 mg/l.
Based on Roholms' work and other recent studies, there is every reason
to believe that the increasing numbers of people with carpal-tunnel syndrome
and arthritic-like pains are due to the mass fluoridation of drinking
water.
Summary and Conclusions
NAEP's early efforts to define a code of ethics
for professionals directly influenced the EPA professionals' Union's own
efforts to affect the ethical climate at EPA. In 1988, the Union drafted
a Code of Ethics but encountered resistance from EPA management. Nine
years later an agreement was reached, although it still does not provide
concrete procedures for addressing ethical issues, nor sufficient protection
for individuals identifying ethical crimes. The Union believes that an
understanding of the unethical nature of the fluoride drinking water standard
will confirm the urgent necessity for significantly improving the existing
agreement between EPA professionals and management.
With regards to the fluoride standard, we found:
* The PHS, who was charged with providing advice to EPA, had a conflict
of interest.
* The Committee selected by the PHS to provide advice to EPA was biased.
* The deliberations of the Committee were not honestly presented in their
draft report.
* The draft report was altered by unknown individuals without prior (or
subsequent) approval of the Committee.
* Individuals who knew of fraud and deceit in the report did not report
their observations to the appropriate authorities.
* EPA management ordered the support document developed by EPA professionals
to be rewritten in conflict with the known facts.
* Important calculations and observations were omitted from the selection
of the final standard for apparently political purposes, namely, to support
a long-standing public health policy.
We are unable to present all the details of scientific fraud that occurred
in this regulation because of the limits of space in this forum (e.g.
the fact that 90% of the scientific literature showing that fluoride is
mutagenic were omitted from the scientific support document.) Hopefully,
some of your elected representatives in Congress will become aware of
these accusations and begin an investigation. The public needs to see
how politics influences science in Washington, and how public health can
take a back seat when power and prestige are more important than ethical
considerations.
APPENDIX
"ARTICLE XXI. PROFESSIONALISM AT EPA"25
"The Parties agree:
A. The American people must have complete confidence that EPA professionals
and managers perform their functions and duties with honesty, integrity,
and in an unbiased manner. The public interest is best served when the
Agency performs its functions in a manner consistent with the requirements
of law, objective and dispassionate science, competent technical analysis
and decisions, and concern for effective and consistent enforcement, voluntary
compliance and effective implementation.
B. The responsibility to serve the public interest and promote the environmental
ethic is the shared responsibility of management and bargaining-unit members.
Bargaining-unit employees are encouraged to disclose questionable activities
to appropriate officials..
C. Bargaining-unit professionals who disclose or report fraud, waste or
abuse or who engage in protected activity may not be subjected to retaliation,
reprisal or coercion in employment for doing so.
D. The parties specifically recognize
1. the ethical obligations stated in the regulations promulgated by the
Office of Government Ethics, at 5 CFR 22635.101, EPA's supplemental regulations
at 5 CFR Part 6401, and the employee responsibilities under 18 USC 203-209;
2. the prohibited personnel actions stated in 5 USC 2301, enforced by
the Office of Special Counsel pursuant to 5 USC 1212 et seq.;
3. to the extent applicable, the employee protections under the Department
of Labor Regulations at 29 CFR Part 24;
4. the criminal penalties for false statements to the Federal Government
at 18 USC 1001;
5. the provisions of the False Claims Act, 31 USC 3730(h); and
6. new or superseding laws, rules or regulations covering professionalism.
Excerpts from the above cited provisions are provided in Supplement 1
to this Agreement for reference.
E. Nothing in this provision negates or supersedes management's rights
as enumerated in Article IV of this Agreement.
F. At either Party's request, the Parties will open negotiations one time
during the term of this contract on subjects of further protections of
employees from reprisals and procedures for resolution of disputes involving
professional judgment.
References
1. National Association of Environmental Professionals,
"Code of Ethics and Standards of Practice for Environmental Professionals,"undated,
available on the WEB at http://www.naep.org/ ethics.html.
2. See characterization of a corrupt government
bureaucrat by Charles Trueheart, "Verdict Nears in Trial of Vichy
Official," Washington Post, A21, 4/1/98.
3. 5 USC 7103.
4. "Collective bargaining agreement between
EPA management and NFFE Local 2050, Article XXI. Professionalism at EPA,"
..........
5. The Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. 300f,
et seq.
6. "National Primary Drinking Water Regulations;
Fluoride," Federal Register, 50(220): 47142-47171, 11/14/85.
7. Mullan, F.; Plagues and Politics, the Story
of the United States Public Health Service. Basic Books, Inc.
8. Loe, H.; letter to Bernice O. Berg, 3/7/90.
9. Shapiro, J.R.: "Report to the Surgeon General:
by the Ad Hoc Committee on the Non-Dental Health Effects of Fluoride in
Drinking Water," 9/26/83.
10. Transcript of the "Surgeon General's Ad Hoc Committee
on the Non-Dental Effects of Fluoride," 4/18 -19/1983, National Institutes
of Health, Bethesda, Maryland. obtained under the Freedom of Information
Act by Ms. Martha Bevis, Safe Water Foundation of Texas.
11. Griffiths, J.; "'83 Transcripts Show Fluoride Disagreements."
Medical Tribune, 30(11), 4/20/89.
12. Shapiro, J.R.; first draft of report on the non-dental
health effects of fluoride exposure by an ad hoc committee appointed by
the Surgeon General of the U.S., 5/26/83.
13. Grossman, D.; "Fluoride's Revenge, Has this cure,
too, become a disease?," The Progressive, 29-32, Dec. 1990.
14. McClure, F.J.; Water Fluoridation, the Search and the Victory,
HEW, 1970.
15. Small, J.; memo to Jay Shapiro, chairman of Surgeon General's
ad hoc committee on the non-dental health effects of fluoride in drinking
water, 6/1/83.
16. Koop, C.E.; letter to William D. Ruckelshaus, 1/23/84.
17. "National Primary Drinking Water Regulations; Fluoride,"
Federal Register, 50(93): 20164-20175, 5/14/85.
18. "Labor Secretary Reich Orders EPA Scientist Dr. Bill
Marcus Reinstated, EPA Corruption Exposed," The Fluoride Report,
2(1), April 1994.
19. Press release circulated within EPA Headquarters, 1985.
20. Kim, V.; Memorandum to William Ruckelshaus, 7/26/84.
21. Roholm, K.; Fluorine Intoxication, A Clinical-Hygiene Study,
With a Review of the Literature and Some Experimental Investigations.
H.K. Lewis & Co., Ltd., London, 1937.
22. National Academy of Sciences, Fluoride: Biological Effects
of Atmospheric Pollutants, 1971.
23. Hodge, H.C.; "Safety of Fluoride Tablets or Drops,"
Chapter 11 in Continuous Evaluation of the Use of Fluorides, (AA Symposium,
Boulder, Colorado), Westview Press, 1979.
24. National Academy of Sciences, National Research Council,
Health Effects of Ingested Fluoride, p59, 1993.
25. From the Collective Bargaining Agreement between the National
Federation of Federal Employees, Local 2050 and the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency, Washington, D.C., September 19, 1997.
As of April 20, 1998, EPA professionals are represented by the National Treasury Employees (NTEU) Union, Chapter 280.